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URBAN LAW ANNUAL
housing shortage is thereby placed upon a select group of land-
lords.1 97
As we enter a new decade, we are faced with the dilemma of
resolving this inequitable situation while providing affordable, de-
cent, safe, and sanitary housing for low- and moderate-income ten-
ants. Both the interest of the landlord in his right to income from his
property and the equally important right of the tenant to security in
his home must be recognized. Expansion of rent and good cause
eviction controls919 on a statewide basis is a viable solution provided
that a landlord's right to a fair return on his investment is assured.
Development of a long-term solution to the housing dilemma must
also include expansion in the areas of public housing and relocation
subsidies.
IV. PUBLIC HOUSING: THE EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING
ALLOWANCE PROGRAM
Passage of the Federal Housing Act of 19371 91 committed this
country to the goal of providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings
for low-income families.2co Throughout the years, Congress has con-
sidered and enacted various housing programs that have sought to
improve the quality and increase the supply of low- and moderate-
income housing.2 °" A major component of the federal housing effort
197. For an informative discussion of the pros and cons of rent control, see BREN-
NER & FRANKLiN, supra note 151.
198. California and Florida have enacted good cause eviction statutes that protect
tenants of mobile home parks. See CAL. CrwL CODE §§ 798.55-.86 (Deering Supp.
1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.759 (West Supp. 1980).
199. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 88.
200. The national policy of the federal government as applied to public housing is
to promote:
the general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit ... to assist
the several states and their political subdivisions to alleviate present and recur-
ring unemployment and to remedy the unsafe and insanitary [sic] housing condi-
tions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of
low income, in rural or urban communities, that are injurious to the health,
safety, and morals of the citizens of the Nation.
I.d § 1.
201. Set Housing and Rent Act of 1949, ch. 41, 63 Stat. 18; Housing Act of 1950,
ch. 94, 64 Stat. 48; Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590; Housing Act of 1961;
Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149; Housing and Urban Development Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769; Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-117 79 Stat. 451. See also Catz, Historical and Political Background of Federal
[Vol. 21:317
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consists of public housing programs. These programs use govern-
ment subsidies to encourage rehabilitation of existing substandard
structures or construction of new units. Once these dwellings become
fit for habitation, they are allocated to low-income families selected
from a pool of eligible applicants. 22
The advisability of tying housing subsidies to individual structures,
as opposed to directly aiding the families in need, has been debated
for years.203 Advocates for direct consumer subsidies, sometimes
called "rent certificates" or "housing allowances," stress the simplic-
ity of administering direct subsidies and argue that such a program
would enhance housing opportunities for the poor.2° These positive
attributes of the housing allowance concept were seriously discussed
prior to passage of the Housing Act of 1937,205 during the Taft Sub-
Public Housing Programs, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 25 (1973); Mulvhill, Problems in the
Management of Public Housing, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 163 (1962); Risenfeld & Eastlund,
Public Aid to Housing and Land Development, 34 MINN. L. REv. 610 (1950).
202. The present-day operation of the Housing Act is illustrative of the traditional
method for allocating housing. Under the terms of the conventional public housing
program:
income limits for occupancy and rents shall be fixed by the public housing
agency and approved by the Secretary. The rental for any dwelling unit shall not
exceed one-fourth of the family's income as defined by the Secretary.... At
least 20 per centum of the dwelling units in any project placed under annual
contributions contracts ... shall be occupied by very low-income families.
42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1976).
The § 8 program, id § 1437f, has many similarities to a housing allowance ap-
proach. Under this program, a local housing authority enters into an annual contri-
butions contract (ACC) with HUD, that allocates a specified subsidy to the local
housing authority on an annual basis. Id § 1437f(b). The local agency then invites
low-income households to apply for Certificates of Family Participation. When a
family has established its eligibility and is issued a certificate, it can enter the private
rental market and locate a landlord who is willing to participate in the program by
renting a unit at or below the established Fair Market Rent. 24 C.F.R. § 882.103
(1980). After the signing of a lease, the local housing authority and landlord enter
into a Housing Assistance Payments Contract, under which the housing authority
promises to pay the difference between the family's rental obligation and the agreed
rent for the unit. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f) (1976). The institution of the § 8 program has
been called "a very small drop in the large bucket of housing deprivation in the
United States." Whitman, Federal Housing Assistancefor the Poor: OldProblems and
New Directions, 9 URY3. LAW 1, 57 (1977).
203. See notes 205-07 and accompanying text infra.
204. See, e.g., F. DELEEUW, THE HoUsING ALLOWANCE APPROACH (U No.
10020, 1971); Mattox, Rent Allowances, 28 J. Hous. 482 (1971); Solomon & Fenton,
The Nation's First Experience with Housing Allowances: The Kansas City Demonstra-
tion, 50 LAND ECON. 213, 215 (1974).
205. See generally Amendments to the National HousingAct: Hearing on H.R 8520
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committee hearings on post-war housing policy in 1944,206 and dur-
ing the congressional deliberations on the Housing Act of 1949.2o7 In
each instance the idea was rejected.
In 1965, Congress enacted the rent supplement program208 that
provided income-related subsidies to residents of privately-owned
housing units. Although the subsidies remained linked to the dwell-
ing, the rent supplement program resembled a housing allowance in
that it relied upon the private market to supply low- and moderate-
income housing.2° 9
In the same year, Congress enacted the section 23 leased housing
program. 10 This program had even greater similarities to a housing
allowance. Local housing authorities leased "modest but adequate"
privately-owned housing, that was then sublet to eligible appli-
cants.2 ' The difference between the cost of the rent and a formula
determination of what the family could afford comprised the govern-
ment subsidy. 12
Before the House Comm, on Banking and Currency, 74th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1937).
See also Amendments to the National Housing Act." Hearing on S. 3055 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 75th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1937).
206. See generally Hearings of the Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy
and Planning before the Senate Subcomnr on Housing and Urban Development, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1944-1945).
207. See generally The Housing Act of 1949. Hearings on HA 4009 before the
House Comm on Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949).
208. The program was created by § 101 of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701(s) (1976)).
209. Due to early opposition to the program and its general lack of funding, the
rent supplement program was never extensively used. See Beckham, The Experimen-
tal Housing Allowance Program, 30 J. Hous. 12, 
13 (1973).
210. Section 23 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-117, 79 Stat. 455 (1965).
211. Id §23(a)(1).
212. The annual contribution under this Act for a project of a public housing
agency for low-rent housing in private accommodations... shall not exceed the
amount of the fixed annual contribution which would be established under this
Act for a newly constructed project by such public housing agency designed to
accommodate the comparable number, sizes, and kind of families.
Id § 23(e). This formula of the § 23 program prevented its participants from letting
"luxury" apartments and then partially paying the rent with government subsidies.
Compare this early approach with the current rent ceiling of the § 8 program:
The maximum monthly rent shall not exceed by more than 10 per centum the
fair market rental established by the Secretary... for existing or newly con-
structed rental dwelling units of various sizes and types in the market area suita-
ble for occupancy by persons assisted under this section. ...
(Vol. 21:317
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The section 23 program differed from a housing allowance pro-
gram in that the subsidy was directly attached to the dwelling. Addi-
tionally, the housing authority handled landlord-tenant
negotiations. 2"3 The primary advantage of this program was its abil-
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (1976).
A conventional housing allowance program would not have a ceiling of this sort.
While at some point, the mathematics of a housing allowance would preclude the
participation of a household renting a high-priced apartment, see note 233 infra, the
opportunity to choose housing from within a reasonable price range gives the housing
allowance approach added attractiveness over the § 8 program. See P. ZAIS, J.
GOEDERT, & J. TRUTKO, MODIFYING SECTION 8: IMPLICATIONS FROM EXPERIMENTS
WITH HOUSING ALLOWANCES 5-28 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MODIFYING SECTION
8.
213. The diagrams below describe the legal relationships of the landlord, house-
hold, and housing authority in the § 23 and § 8 programs, the housing allowance
program (EHAP), and the private market.
AgencyF ,
Landlord A Hous old
Section 8 Existing Housing Program
- Agency....
Landlord Household
*--------------------
Housing Allowance (EHAP)
Agency,:...'
Landlord Household
Private Market
Agency
Landlord ( 0 Household
< ---------------------
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ity to utilize the existing housing supply in a broad range of neigh-
borhoods.
In 1968, the President's Committee on Urban Housing (the Kaiser
Committee)2 14 acknowledged that the housing allowance concept
provided an efficient method of adjusting the supply of housing to
meet the needs of low-income households. Noting the theoretical
problems of such a program, the Kaiser Committee nevertheless rec-
ommended the implementation of a housing allowance program on
an experimental basis.215
Congress responded with the enactment of the Experimental Hous-
ing Allowance Program (EHAP),2 16 a research program designed to
test the feasibility of a housing allowance program on a national
scale. For decades, the housing allowance debate had divided along
purely partisan lines.217 The sole objective of EHAP was to provide
See MODIFYING SECTION 8, supra note 214, at 39.
Key
Contract
-------- Payment
.............. Eligibility Certification
214. President Johnson assigned the committee the task of finding "a way to har-
ness the productive power of America. . .to provide the basic necessities of a decent
home and healthy surroundings for every American family. .. ." REPORT OF THE
PREsiDENT's COMMITrEE ON URBAN HousiNG: A DECENT HOME 1 (1968).
215. The committee was reluctant to recommend a full-scale program because of
its fears of housing inflation and because there was an immediate need for new con-
struction that was best met by project subsidies. Id at 71.
216. Sections 501 and 504 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970
Public Law 91-609 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-3 (a-g) (1976)), authorized imple-
mentation of the EHAP.
Prior to Congressional action, the Model City Agencies conducted housing allow-
ance experiments on a very limited scale in Kansas City, Missouri and Wilmington,
Delaware. For a review of the Kansas City experience, see Kushner & Keating, The
Kansas City HousingAllowance Experience: Subsidiesfor the Real Estate Industry and
Palliativesafor the Poor, 7 URB. LAW. 239 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kushner &
Keating]; Mattox, Rent Allowances, 28 J. Hous. 482 (1971); Solomon & Fenton, The
Nation's First Experience with Housing Allowances: The Kansas City Demonstration,
50 LAND ECON. 213 (1974).
217. Since most of the discussion prior to the EHAP was purely conjectural, the
analysis often reveals little more than the political biases of the authors. See, e.g.,
Hartman & Keating, The Housing Allowance Delusion, 44 Soc. POLICY 31 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Hartman & Keating]. For a review of the usual assumptions that
proved to be incorrect, see U.S. DEPT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A
[Vol. 21:317
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empirical facts to either support or refute alleged advantages and ob-
jections.
The data collected from EHAP has recently become available.218
This section will review the results and analyze the implications for
public housing. Typical objections to the housing allowance concept
will first be reviewed in order to put the analysis in proper perspec-
tive.
A. The Criticism
Proponents of the housing allowance strategy argue that by in-
creasing the purchasing power and, thereby, the economic leverage of
the poor, landlords would be induced to build more standard hous-
ing. Advocates also argue that allowing participants their choice of
housing will avoid public controversy over the location of subsidized
projects and optimize consumer satisfaction.2 19 Criticism of the
housing allowance approach falls into three specific categories.
1. Rent Inflation
Critics claim that a housing allowance program ignores the fact
that many urban areas have a shortage of decent, modestly priced
housing. They argue that since housing supply is inelastic on a short
term basis, the increased demand occasioned by an allowance sub-
sidy may lead to rent inflation. As a result, a housing allowance pro-
gram could have a devastating effect on households not quite poor
enough to meet the income guidelines. Thus, some housing experts
believe that housing allowances will benefit landlords far more than
low-income families. '
2. Perpetuation of Slum Housing
Opponents argue that in addition to inflating rents, a housing al-
lowance program could promote the marketability of substandard
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE CURRENT FINDINGS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING
ALLOWANCE PROGRAM 7-8 (1978).
218. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, EXPERIMENTAL Hous-
ING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM: A 1979 REPORT OF FINDINGS [hereinafter cited as 1979
REPORT].
219. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A
DECENT HOME 71 (1968).
220. See, e.g., Hartman & Keating, supra note 217, at 40; DeLeeuw & Ekanem,
The Supply of Rental Housing, 61 AM. EcON. REv. 806, 817 (1971).
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housing. When a seller's market prevails, landlords may attempt to
capture the additional consumer income by making only minimal re-
pairs. The additional allowance income would also encourage land-
lords to keep low quality dwellings on the market, that otherwise
might have been abandoned and demolished.22z
Some experts also believe that a housing allowance program would
accelerate the deterioration of urban neighborhoods. The theory sug-
gests that housing allowance recipients will provide ready buyers for
houses in "soft" markets, or neighborhoods showing the first signs of
blight. Thus, an influx of housing allowance purchasers would be
likely to encourage blockbusting and white flight. In sum, a housing
allowance program may lead to the disruption of urban housing mar-
kets.
222
3. Market Imperfections
The housing allowance concept assumes that by supplementing
housing income, participants will have the economic leverage to de-
mand better quality housing and be able to select from a larger vari-
ety of housing. These goals of consumer autonomy are undercut in
localities where either the landlord legally dominates the landlord-
tenant relationship, or pervasive housing discrimination exists. If, for
example, a black household is denied access to a white housing mar-
ket, landlords are effectively shielded from competition and the
household's choices are correspondingly limited. Under these condi-
tions, a housing allowance program would fail to ameliorate the mar-
ket imperfections of housing discrimination and tenant abuse.223
B. The Experiment
Congress intended to resolve these economic doubts through
EHAP.224 The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) divided the experiment into three projects, each designed to
isolate specific economic factors.
The Demand Experiment was conducted over a three year period
in the Pittsburgh and Phoenix metropolitan areas.225 This project
221. See generally Kushner & Keating, supra note 216, at 243-345.
222. See, e.g., id. at 245-253.
223. See, e.g., Hartman & Keating, supra note 217, at 36.
224. 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-3(a)-(g) (1976).
225. HUD surveyed approximately 50,000 families from which it selected a repre-
[Vol. 21:317
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sought to measure consumer response to housing allowances. More
specifically, it measured the rates of participation among eligible
households and attempted to categorize successful participants. It
also provided data on the effects allowance subsidies have on partici-
pant mobility and calculated the portion of allowance payments used
for housing.226
HUD obtained statistics by comparing the types of housing chosen
by families on a constrained payment plan with the housing chosen
by families on an unconstrained plan. Families on a constrained
payment plan were required to locate dwellings meeting minimum
housing code standards while those on the unconstrained plan could
rent or buy housing of any quality. ' 7 A major premise of EHAP was
that no household should receive allowance payments unless it re-
sided in a dwelling meeting EHAP standards." s The Demand Ex-
sentative group of participants. Between the two sites, approximately 2,400 families
eventually received some form of a housing allowance. 1979 REPORT, supra note 218,
at 4.
226. Id at 33-50.
227. The EHAP housing standard is very much like a conventional housing code:
each dwelling is required to have certain amenities such as adequate plumbing, kitch-
en facilities, light, and electrical outlets before it can pass inspection. 1979 REPORT,
supra note 218, at 103-05. Unfortunately, the criteria for the housing standard varied
slightly from project to project. It was not thought, however, that the discrepancy
adversely affected the EHAP results. See J. VELENZA, PROGRAM HOUSING STAN-
DARDS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM: ANALYZING DIF-
FERENCES IN THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY EXPERIMENTs 5-10 (1977).
228. Perhaps the primary objective of a housing allowance program is that,
through private consumer selection, housing will be obtained that is of higher quality
than the consumer's previous nonsubsidized dwelling. Clearly, if the allowance pay-
ment were not conditioned upon the household living in a minimum quality dwelling,
the program would in practical terms be little more than an income or welfare supple-
ment program. Welfare supplement programs have been especially problematical in
theory and application. See, e.g., D. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED
INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN (1973).
A housing allowance program need not inexorably be constrained. Great Britain
has instituted an allowance program that provides payments for families residing in
dwellings of any quality. See general,y J. TRUTKO, 0. HETZEL, & A. YATES, A COM-
PARISON OF THE EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM AND GREAT BRIT-
AIN'S RENT ALLOWANCE PROGRAM (1978).
A persuasive argument can be made, however, that a minimum housing standard
should apply irrespective of the family's personal preferences. The theory suggests
that since a substandard dwelling has negative external effects on its neighboring
structures and would therefore drive down the real estate values of a neighborhood, a
federal housing allowance program could impose certain obligations on participants
to prevent neighborhood blight. See Whitman, Federal Housing 4ssistance for the
Poor: Old Problems and New Directions, 9 URB. LAW. 1, 38 (1977). Thus, although
1981]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/16
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
periment was situated in Pittsburgh and Phoenix in order to provide
comparable data from an older, slowly growing Eastern city with that
of a new, rapidly expanding Southwestern city.
The Supply Experiment, conducted in Brown County, Wisconsin
and St. Joseph County, Indiana accumulated data on many of the
same issues. The mechanics of the program, however, differed in im-
portant ways. This experiment marked the first instance in the his-
tory of public housing that enrollment was open to all eligible
families, including renters and homeowners.229 The allowance pay-
ment equalled the difference between the cost of modest, standard
housing and twenty-five percent of the family's preallowance in-
come.2 0 The payments were constrained 231 and cancelled if the
consumer preference is the hallmark of an allowance program, that personal choice
should not be allowed to be exercised at the expense of nonparticipating households.
229. 1979 REPORT, su.pra note 218, at 5. Of course, in the conventional public
housing program, nearly everyone is allowed to apply. Only a select few, however,
qualify for assistance. See note 202 and accompanying text supra. In the Supply
Experiment, every household which located or repaired a structure in order to meet
the housing standard automatically received an allowance.
230. Two payment formulas were used. The allowance subsidy which is based
upon the difference between rent paid and one-fourth of the household's income
seems generally favored by housing analysts. This formula, known as the "housing
gap formula," is calculated to provide an allowance equal to the difference between
the market rent for an adequate unit of appropriate size and percentage of the house-
hold's income. The formula is as follows:
P = C* - bY,
Where: P = Allowance payment
C* = Estimate of market rent of
adequate housing
b = The rate at which the
allowance is reduced as
income increased (usually
25% in EHAP)
Y = Program-defined income
1979 REPORT, supra note 218, at 85.
The Demand Experiment tested the application of the "percentage of rent
formula." This formula calculates the allowance amount as a fraction of the rent paid
by an eligible household. Though an upper limit on the rent may be set, the formula
encourages households to locate modestly priced housing since their own housing
expenditures will increase in proportion to the increase in total rent. The percentage
of rent formula gives the household greater independence in choosing housing but
may, in the long run, be a more expensive subsidy than the housing gap formula. The
percentage of rent allowance is computed as follows:
[Vol. 21:317
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units fell below the program's quality standards. Brown County,
Wisconsin was selected because it is representative of a relatively
tight housing market in a growing urban center with a small minority
population. St. Joseph County, Indiana represents a declining cen-
tral city with a large minority population surrounded by white sub-
urbs.23
2
The Administrative Agency Experiment gathered information re-
garding the cost of administering and delivering housing allowances.
Disbursed at eight locations throughout the country,233 agencies ex-
perimented with different methods of selecting participants, inspect-
ing units, subsidizing families, and providing other services related to
a housing allowance program.2" The Administrative Agency Exper-
iment primarily tested the hypothesis that a housing allowance pro-
ject should be less costly to operate than conventional public housing.
C. The Results
The results of EHAP are quite startling. They reveal that a na-
tional housing allowance program would have a negligible impact on
housing and rental prices.23 Furthermore, racial discrimination in
housing was not a major obstacle to successful operation of the pro-
gram.2 36 EHAP data also indicates that participants generally in-
P = aR for R C*/a;
P = C* for R ' C*/a
Where: P = Allowance payment
R = Rent paid by household
a = Percentage of rent paid by
government
C* = Maximum payment
allowed
Id
231. See note 227 and accompanying text supra.
232. 1979 REPORT, supra note 218, at 5-6.
233. The projects were located at: Salem, Oregon; Springfield, Massachusetts; Pe-
oria, Illinois; San Bernardino, California; Bismarck, North Dakota; Jacksonville,
Florida; Durham, North Carolina; and Tulsa, Oklahoma. Id. at 62.
234. Id at 62-75.
235. Id at 55-61.
236. Id at 47,49. According to the participants surveyed, racial discrimination in
housing ranked behind discrimination against children, the participant's source of
income, and marital status. Whereas over a third of the households did report some
1981]
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creased their spending on housing. This allowed them to obtain
better quality housing or to move to safer, more sanitary neighbor-
hoods.237
Each positive aspect of EHAP, however, is countered by a negative
trade-off. Many eligible participants would not or could not success-
fully meet nonfinancial EHAP requirements. 38 Many participants
responded to the requirement that they locate minimum standard
housing or rehabilitate their existing dwelling by dropping out of the
program." 9 Thus, housing demand remained largely unaffected and
rent inflation did not occur. Additionally, although housing discrimi-
nation may not have been widely reported, the results of EHAP indi-
cate that a housing allowance will do almost nothing to promote
racial or economic integration.24
The allowance payments did induce families to spend more on
housing, but the increase was not in proportion to the subsidy re-
ceived. For many participants, the allowance payments were simply
viewed as a general income supplement.241 An income supplement
of this variety would cost approximately $7.4 billion per year if insti-
tuted nationwide.242
HUD officials forecast that while approximately twenty percent of
the country's households are income-eligible for a housing allowance
program, only fifty percent of eligible renters and thirty percent of
eligible homeowners would participate.243 This is because many par-
ticipants are either unwilling or unable to locate housing that meets
program standards.
There are several reasons why a substantial number of EHAP ap-
plicants failed to locate adequate housing. First, many applicants
were satisfied with their existing dwellings and neighborhood. Many
type of housing discrimination, the fact that the allowance program allowed the fami-
lies to seek housing elsewhere mitigated these practices.
237. Id at 35-40.
238. Id at 23-32.
239. Nearly a third of the households not meeting the housing quality require-
ment did not even bother to search. Id at 46.
240. Id at 47.
241. Id at 38.
242. Id at 75. This sum is comparable to that spent for public housing programs.
In 1976, $7.5 billion was spent to provide public housing. See Department ofHousing
and Urban Development Budget Outlays, [1976] 3 Hous. & DEY. REP. (BNA) 841.
243. 1979 REPoRT, supra note 218, at 23.
[Vol, 21:31 7
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felt that the allowance payments did not provide sufficient compensa-
tion to justify sacrificing proximity to schools, work, relatives, and
friends. 2" Others cited bureaucratic red tape, the minimal amount
of money offered, and a reluctance to take money from the govern-
ment as reasons for dropping out of the program. 245
Perhaps the most significant factor that kept participation down
was the EHAP requirement that a participant's dwelling meet a mini-
mum housing standard.246 This requirement resulted in a break-
down of applicants into two classes: those already living in
acceptable housing who immediately qualified for the allowance, and
those living in unacceptable housing who had to repair or relocate in
order to qualify. Statistics show that families living in low standard
housing were most likely to fail the program.247
Mobility of the applicants also had a direct bearing on their suc-
cessful participation in the program. Renters participated at higher
rates than homeowners.248 Younger groups participated at higher
244. In the metropolitan areas of Pittsburgh and Phoenix, over 72% were satisfied
with both their unit and neighborhood. Id at 46.
245. Id
246. After analyzing the EHAP results, HUD officials concluded that tying house-
hold requirements to allowance payments caused a 20-26% decrease in renters' partic-
ipation. Id at 23. While this analysis underlies the theme of the HUD report, it
should be contrasted with the results of the housing allowance program conducted in
Great Britain.
In 1972, the British Parliament passed the Housing Finance Act that established a
Rent Allowance Program for low-income private rental tenants. The Rent Allowance
Program and EHAP operate similarly. The programs differ, however, in that in Great
Britain participants are not required to reside in apartments meeting a minimum
housing standard. Despite the lenient requirements of the Rent Allowance Program,
only 40-50% of the eligible households participate in the program. This rate of partic-
ipation closely tracks the figures of the EHAP. See note 243 and accompanying text
supra. Moreover, the reasons given for nonparticipation-lack of program aware-
ness, perceptions of ineligibility, program stigma-are identical in both programs
once the housing standard requirement is excluded from the analysis. See J.
TRUTKO, 0. HETZEL, & A. YATES, A COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIMENTAL HOUSING
ALLOWANCE PROGRAM AND GREAT BRITAIN'S RENT ALLOWANCE PROGRAM Vii-Xii
(1978).
Since EHAP shows that most eligible participants will refuse to locate adequate
housing, and the British experience further discloses that participation will not in-
crease when there is no housing requirement whatsoever, severe doubts must be
raised as to whether a federal program can be devised that will receive enough popu-
lar support to provide "decent, safe, and sanitary" dwellings for the citizens of the
nation. 1979 REPORT, supra note 218, at 8-9.
247. Id
248. Id at 21.
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rates than the elderly,249 and people living in the Southwest (who
seem to have a greater propensity to move) fared better than
Northeasterners. 250
The results of EHAP disclose that the social market effects result-
ing from a housing allowance program should be minimal. The
number of participants who moved was approximately equal to the
number who could have been expected to move had they not re-
ceived allowance payments.251 Those families who did move tended
to follow the racial and ethnic demographic patterns of the open mar-
ket.25
2
The housing allowance program did not have a noticeable eco-
nomic impact. For example, it did not persuade landlords and devel-
opers to engage in major rehabilitation or new construction.25 3
EHAP, therefore, suggests that a housing allowance program would
have little effect on the absolute number of decent housing units
available in a market. It would seem, however, that an allowance
program should significantly improve overall housing quality.
EHAP documented a number of instances where the allowance in-
duced renters and homeowners to make minor repairs on their dwell-
ings.254 Most dwellings had only one or two defects and were often
repaired by the occupants themselves with low out-of-pocket ex-
pense. HUD analysts note that housing improvements need not be
expensive to significantly improve the welfare of inhabitants. 2"
By explicitly earmarking allowance payments for home improve-
ments, it appears that the recipient will allocate a portion of the al-
lowance for those expenses.256 In a majority of the cases, however,
most of the allowance was not spent on rehabilitation of the struc-
ture.257 This should not be surprising in view of the fact that the
average rent burden of an EHAP household was about forty percent
249. Id at 18-21.
250. Id Regional differences in household mobility were documented in the
MICHIGAN PANEL SURVEY OF INCOME DYNAMIcs (SID) (1974), refproduced in 1979
REPORT, supra note 218, at 43.
251. Id. at 44.
252. Id at 50.
253. Id at 61.
254. Id at 58.
255. Id at 61.
256.. Id at 34.
257. Id at 39.
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of income and many rents exceeded the fifty percent mark.258 Unde-
niably, the housing allowance payment was viewed by its recipients
as a rental subsidy.259
D. Conclusion
If the housing allowance approach is to be taken seriously, it is
important to realistically portray its benefits and burdens. EHAP
clearly demonstrates that a housing allowance optimizes consumer
choice and independence while minimizing governmental interfer-
ence in the private market.
A restrictive view must be taken, however, as to the possible
broader social goals of a housing allowance program. An allowance
program will not serve to readjust the imbalance of economic and
legal power between landlords and tenants. Nor will it ameliorate
the existing racial segregation in cities. Nevertheless, these conclu-
sions should not obliterate the fact that a housing allowance program
would improve the living conditions of its participants and create
new housing opportunities. An allowance program would effectuate
these goals by placing a premium on self-reliance rather than on the
usual governmental intermediation.
A look at the primary constituency of a housing allowance pro-
gram-young, economically mobile homeowners living in the "open"
housing markets of the Midwest and West-indicates that the hous-
ing allowance debate will once again divide along partisan lines. It
would seem, though, that the housing allowance approach offers op-
portunities to those families who have not heretofore fit the public
housing mold. If the concept were proposed as a supplement to,
rather than a replacement for, conventional public housing programs,
then it could well become a politically and economically feasible
public housing strategy.
V. GOVERNMENTAL RELOCATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Owning property in the inner city has once again become attractive
to middle- and upper-income persons. Close proximity to downtown
activities, minimal fuel costs, and the desire to live in a traditional
neighborhood setting have enticed the affluent to purchase homes in
258. Id
259. Id at 38-39.
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